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UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED AS "ENEMY
COMBATANTS": THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS A MATTER OF
ETHICS
Jesselyn A. Radack"
The Supreme Court will decide as a matter of law whether an American citizen
detained as an enemy combatant has the right to counsel. The author argues that
as a matter of ethics, the answer is clear - there is a right to counsel. In this
Article, the author analyzes the cases regarding Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam
Hamdi discusses ABA Model Rule 4.2, and its application, and proposes an
amendment to Rule 4.2's Comment.
INTRODUCTION
Sacrifices of civil rights and liberties in this country since September 11 th,
particularly those belonging to United States citizens detained as "enemy
combatants,"' highlight the urgent need to speak out against government attorneys
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(http://www.cradl.info).
The author wishes to thank the William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal for allowing an
earlier version of this article to be circulated by the ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy
Combatants.
This article is dedicated to Jane Mayer for her intellectual integrity, journalistic courage,
belief in the underdog and unrelenting pursuit of truth.
The controversial executive designation of "enemy combatant" is used to detain
individuals whom the government suspects have intelligence about the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. The designation dates back to 1942, when the Supreme Court ruled that the
same designation applied to Nazi saboteurs who landed by submarine on American shores
to blow up industrial plants. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The eight men were
tried before a military commission. One of them had a plausible claim of American
citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled this to be irrelevant, for "citizens who associate
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts" qualified as "enemy belligerents." Id. at
37-38.
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flouting legal ethics.2 The plight of American enemy combatants is a chilling
reminder of the words of German anti-Nazi activist, Pastor Martin Niemller:
First they came for the Jews
and I did not speak out - because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for the communists
and I did not speak out - because I was not a communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists
and I did not speak out - because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for me -
and by then there was no one left to speak out for me.3
At first blush, this may seem like hyperbole. The average American may think
that "they," meaning the government (military or civilian), cannot come for him.4
But the reality is that the Executive can detain an American citizen in solitary
confinement without charges, indefinitely and incommunicado, on the basis of a
2 This Article is not the first to suggest serious ethical lapses by the Justice Department
in the name of fighting terrorism. See, e.g., D. Mark Jackson, Has Attorney General John
Ashcroft, in Alleged Terrorism Cases, Violated Government Ethics Rules Governing
Prosecutors' Comments About the Accused?, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at http://writ.
corporate.finlaw.com/commentary/20030130.jackson.html (Jan. 30, 2003) (arguing that
Attorney General Ashcrofl crossed ethical lines by issuing provocative and inflammatory
statements, which have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the accused, in frequent press
conferences about enemy combatants); see also Elaine Cassel, A Recent Judicial Reprimand
of Attorney General Ashcroft Exposes a Pattern of Gag Order and Ethics Violations by His
Office, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/casseV20030430.
html (Apr. 30, 2003) (explaining that Ashcroft was reprimanded by U.S. District Judge
Gerald Rosen for speaking to the media after the judge had issued a gag order and
commenting that this was not the first time Ashcroft had made inappropriate public
comments).
' See generally DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 13 (2d ed. 2002)
(comparing today's response to the threat of terrorism to the anti-Communist hysteria of the
1950s); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil
Liberties in Times of Security Crisis, Address at the Law School of Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, Israel (Dec. 22, 1987) (transcript available at
www.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/nation-securitybrennan.pdf) (discussing how
easily the United States forgets important historical lessons on how perceived threats to
national security, in hindsight often exaggerated or unfounded, have motivated the sacrifice
of civil liberties).
4 The male pronoun is used because all of the United States citizens designated as enemy
combatants thus far are men.
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unilateral determination that he is an enemy combatant.5 There is little chance
anyone will speak out for him because the government is doing its best to deny,
frustrate or compromise any meaningful access to an attorney.6
As circuit authority stands now, "any journalist, aid worker, or human rights
investigator found in Afghanistan could be detained indefinitely as an enemy
combatant."7 If the Executive gets its way in the Domestic Security Enhancement
Act of 2003 (commonly referred to as the Patriot Act 1l),8 the new definition of
"terrorism" would cover tactics used by protest groups such as People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, Operation Rescue and demonstrators at Vieques
Island, Puerto Rico.' "[T]he Act's proscription on associational activity potentially
encompasses every organization that has ever been involved in a civil war or a
crime of violence.., the African National Congress, the Irish Republican Army,
or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan."'1  The proposed Patriot Act l's
citizenship-stripping provision would extend to a citizen's support of even the legal
activities of an organization that the executive branch deems to be "terrorist."'"
' See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,476 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g and reh'g
en banc denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278,
283 (4th Cir. 2002)); James X. Dempsey, The Patriot Act and Other Assaults on Civil
Liberties, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Constitution Society (Oct. 15, 2003).
6 This includes, but is not limited to, refusing to tell the enemy combatant that an
attorney has been retained for him, not allowing an attorney to meet with the client or receive
attorney-client correspondence, and monitoring all attorney-client communications.
' Joanne Mariner, Rhetoric, Rubber-Stamping, and "Meaningful Review": The Recent
Appelate Court Ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at
http:/writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20030120.html (Jan. 20, 2003).
8 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (proposed draft dated Jan. 9, 2003)
available athttp://publicintegrity.orgldtaweb/downloads/storyO-l020703.pdf [hereinafter
Patriot Act II].
' See Kevin Galvin, Why New Law-Enforcement Powers Worry Civil Libertarians,
Common Dreams News Center, at http://www.comondreams.org/headlinesOl/1206-01.htm
(Dec. 6, 2001).
10 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 966-67 (2002).
" See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 85:
The IRA had Sinn Fein, a legal arm engaged in legitimate political activity. The
African National Congress engaged in both violent "terrorist" acts and
nonviolent anti-apartheid activity. And according to Israeli security services,
Hamas, one of the world's most notorious "terrorist groups," devotes ninety-five
percent of its resources to nonviolent social services.
Id.; see also Joanne Mariner, Patriot H's Attack on Citizenship, FindLaw's Legal
Commentary, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/mariner/20030303.html (Mar. 3, 2003).
In other words, if you help fund an orphanage administered by one of the three
Chechen separatist groups that the government has labeled as terrorist, or if you
give pharmaceutical supplies to a medical outpost run by the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement, or if you are on the wrong side of any of a number of other
political conflicts in the world, you are vulnerable to the loss of your citizenship.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales stated that, "People think it is obvious
that an American citizen, for example, would have a right to counsel if detained as
an enemy combatant. But that's not so obvious."'" However, Supreme Court
Justice Stephen G. Breyer "urged attorneys to question government anti-terrorism
practices, including the lack of access to legal counsel for some people detained for
questioning."13 Regardless of where the Supreme Court comes down as a matter of
law on the right to counsel for an American citizen detained as an enemy combatant
- for the Supreme Court is where this question is headed" - as a matter of ethics,
the answer is clear: United States citizens designated as enemy combatants should
be entitled to counsel.
In the case of Jose Padilla, one of two United States citizens now being held by
the Defense Department as illegal enemy combatants, Michael B. Mukasey, Chief
Judge of the Federal District Court of New York, ruled that the individuals Bush
deems as "enemy combatants"'" have the right to a lawyer.'6 He based his decision
not on the Constitution, but on the habeas corpus statute.' 7
In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, the other citizen being held as an unlawful
enemy combatant,' 8 Federal District Judge Robert G. Doumar twice ordered the
Id.
12 Jeanne Cummings, Gonzales Rewrites Laws of War, WAIL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002, at A4
(quoting Mr. Gonzales).
13 Breyer Says Rights Need Guarding in Terror War, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at
A10; cf WILIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAws BuT ONE: CIvu. LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
218-19 (1998) ("Without question the government's authority to engage in conduct that
infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war.").
14 See Editorial, Detention Without End (Cont'd), WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2003, at A22
("[T]he government last week informed Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey of the U.S. District
Court in New York that it will appeal his ruling."); see also Editorial, Hear From Both Sides,
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A20 ('The [Hamdi] decision demands the Supreme Court's
attention.... The Supreme Court must now clarify that doing so [understanding the scope
of any factual disputes] inescapably requires hearing from Mr. Hamdi.").
'" On April 9, 2003, Judge Mukasey ruled that the legality of President Bush's
designation of Padilla as an enemy combatant may be appealed immediately to a higher
court, even before the judge has ruled on the merits of a challenge to Padilla's detention.
Benjamin Weiser, New Turn in 'Dirty Bomb' Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at B15.
6 Padilla ex reL Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
17 Id. at 601-02. The habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by.. . the district courts... within
their respective jurisdictions....
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless -
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States. .. ; or...
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.
,s There are over 60 foreign nationals from more than 40 countries similarly detained at
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military to grant Hamdi access to a federal public defender. 9 However, Doumar's
orders were twice stayed, and upon review, a three-judge panel of the conservative
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals" did not specifically address whether enemy
combatants have a right to a lawyer.2 Even though the Fourth Circuit emphasized
that it "earlier rejected the summary embrace of 'a sweeping proposition - namely
that, with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an
enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the
government's say-so,"' 22 the court did not reject the government's denial of
Hamdi's access to counsel and declared that he was being held lawfully.23
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 4.2,24 which governs
communication with a person represented by counsel, demands consideration in the
debate. It states, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
or is authorized by law to do so."' 5 The Comment states significantly, "the Rule
imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional
the U.S. naval base in GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba, but there has been far more public outcry
about the detention of Padilla and Hamdi than about all the other detainees combined. On
March 11, 2003, a federal appeals court ruled that the detainees have no legal rights in the
United States and may not ask courts to review their detentions. See Neely Tucker, Detainees
Are Denied Access to U.S. Courts, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at Al. However, on
November 10, 2003, the Supreme Court said it will review that conclusion. See Charles Lane,
Justices to Rule on Detainees' Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al.
'9 See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
20 See Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth: How One Appellate Court is Quietly
Moving America Ever Rightward, N.Y. TIviES, Mar. 9, 2003 (Magazine), at 38, 40 (stating
that the Fourth Circuit, which includes Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina
and South Carolina, "is considered the shrewdest, most aggressively conservative federal
appeals court in the nation").
21 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003) ("We have no occasion, for example, to address the
designation as an enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on American soil or the
role that counsel might play in such a proceeding.").
22 Id. at 476 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
23 Id. at 459 ("[W]e hold that the submitted declaration is a sufficient basis upon which
to conclude that the Conimanderin Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the
war powers entrusted to him by the United States Constitution.") However, the court
carefully and explicitly limited its decision to the facts. Id. at 465.
24 MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (2001) [hereinafter MODELRULE 4.2]. This
rule is substantially identical to MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILIrY DR 7-104(A)(1)
(1969) except for the substitution of the term "person" for "party."
21 MODEL RuLE 4.2, supra note 24.
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provisions. 26 Therefore, whether or not American enemy combatants have a
constitutional right to a lawyer, they have an ethical entitlement to one.
This Article submits that it is precisely because the government has asserted,
and the judicial branch has approved, the ability to designate certain individuals as
beyond the shelter of the Bill of Rights," that the ethics rules should be given
special attention.28
The first section of this Article explores the history and purpose of Model Rule
4.2. Although the Sixth Amendment does not apply to enemy combatants, the next
section uses it as a lens through which to examine the ethics issue. The Article goes
on to argue that Model Rule 4.2 should apply to preindictment, custodial, overt
contacts, especially when it comes to enemy combatants. Finally, it suggests that
"intelligence gathering" should not serve as an end-run around the requirements of
criminal law enforcement, and that amending the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 could
prevent this.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND, HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RULE 4.2
The legal background of Model Rule 4.2 bears strongly on the right to counsel
in the case of United States citizen enemy combatants. The ethical prohibition
against such contacts has enjoyed a long history and broad acceptance, extending
back at least to 1836 when David Hoffman first promulgated Resolution Number
XLIII: "I will never enter into any conversation with my opponent's client, relative
to his claim or defence, except with the consent, and in the presence of his
counsel."29
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (2001); see also 4(B) Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 576,581 (1980) (stating that the anti-contact rule, "as generally interpreted, provides
suspects and defendants with protections that the Constitution does not.").
27 Padilla and Hamdi held that President Bush has the authority to order that United
States citizens be detained as enemy combatants. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 606 ("The
President, for the reasons set forth above, has both constitutional and statutory authority to
exercise the powers of Commander in Chief, including the power to detain unlawful
combatants, and it matters not that Padilla is a United States citizen captured on United States
soil."); Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 466 ("The designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant thus
bears the closest imaginable connection to the President's constitutional responsibilities
during the actual conduct of hostilities.").
28 This Article does not attempt to address the detention of foreign nationals in
immigration proceedings, individuals held as material witnesses, or the GuantAnamo Bay
detainees, who, as non-United States citizens, have even fewer fights than other enemy
combatants.
29 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY 771 (Amo Press 1972) (2d ed. 1836), quoted in John Leubsdoif,
Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: the Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 684 n.6 (1979).
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The ABA initially adopted Resolution Number XLIII in 1908 in Canon 9 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics: "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only
with his counsel."" Since that time, rules embodying this fundamental ethical
precept - usually following one of the models offered by the ABA - have been
adopted in every state.
In the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,3 which superseded the 1908
Canons and preceded the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
language closely resembles what is now found in Model Rule 4.2. Additionally, the
Model Code set out the central proposition on which all of the anti-contact rules
have rested: "The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in
need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel."32
Implementing this fundamental premise, the anti-contact rules provide protection
of the represented person against overreaching by adverse counsel, they safeguard
the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel, and they reduce
the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that may
harm their interests.33
To the extent that the spirit of the rule is to serve a societal interest in not
having unrepresented laypersons make decisions of legal consequence, its rationale
should extend to American enemy combatants, with even more justification for its
protective function in that context than in criminal cases. The Department of
Justice acknowledges that the risk of damaging admissions, waiver of privileges,
and misstatements "clearly applies in criminal proceedings, perhaps with more force
than in the civil context."34 It does not seem much of a leap to conclude that these
risks apply in military detentions with even more force than in the civil or criminal
context, for enemy combatants detained indefinitely and incommunicado face far
more severe deprivations of liberty than persons being held for trial.
30 See ABA Comm. on Prof I Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 124 (1934) ("It may be
that this Canon has some relation to Hoffman's Resolutions XLIII.").
31 See MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSEItrrY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1983):
Communicating With One of Adverse Interest.
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in
the matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing
such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
Id.
32 Id. at EC 7-18 (1969).
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that the interview of the defendant, without defendant's lawyer's consent, violated ethical
rules).
4 4(B) Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 584 (1980).
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II. USING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AS A LENS
There seems to be judicial agreement that Padilla and Hamdi have no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel35 in their habeas corpus proceedings.36 The Sixth
Amendment grants that right to the "accused" in a "criminal proceeding." Padilla
and Hamdi are in the custody of the Department of Defense and there is no
"criminal proceeding" in which they are detained. Because the government has not
initiated adversarial judicial proceedings,3 7 it is doubtful that the Sixth Amendment
applies to their circumstances. Beyond the plain language of the Sixth Amendment,
"even in the civilian community a proceeding which may result in deprivation of
liberty is nonetheless not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment if there are elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it from a
traditional civilian criminal trial."38 Such "elements" are abundantly present in the
Padilla and Hamdi cases.
In the case of Jose Padilla, Judge Mukasey aptly suggests that "[allthough...
the right-to-counsel jurisprudence developed in cases applying the Sixth
Amendment does not control this case, there would seem to be no reason why that
jurisprudence cannot at least inform the exercise of discretion here."39 The Sixth
Amendment can also inform the ethics analysis.
In this vein, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
rejects the argument that Model Rule 4.2 either does not apply in the criminal
context, or does not apply until Sixth Amendment rights attach. 0 While the "Sixth
Amendments [sic] provide protections to individuals in the context of a criminal
case, the Constitution establishes only the 'minimal historic safeguards' that
defendants must receive rather than the outer limits of those they may be
afforded. 41
The ABA Board of Governors, at the request of then-President Robert Hirshon,
created the Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants to "examine the
" The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
36 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Padilla
has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this proceeding.").
" See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
PRACTICE SERIES § 11.3 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
38 Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976).
39 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
40 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) at 10
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op.].
4 Id. at 11 (quoting United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990)).
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framework surrounding the detention of United States citizens declared to be
'enemy combatants."' 42 Of the five recommendations the Task Force makes, the
fourth - that "Citizen Detainees Should Not be Denied Access to Counsel '4 3 -
formed "the most complex issue examined by the Task Force."" The Task Force
agrees "that the [Sixth] Amendment right to counsel does not technically attach to
uncharged enemy combatants,"45 but finds it "both paradoxical and unsatisfactory
that uncharged United States citizen detainees have fewer rights and protections
than those who have been charged with serious criminal offenses."46 Indeed,
foreign nationals Zacarias Moussaoui,47 the alleged "twentieth hijacker," and
Richard Reid,4" the convicted "shoe bomber," have more rights than American
citizens Padilla and Hamdi.49
The Padilla and Hamdi decisions follow the release of the final report by the
ABA's Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants. Judge Mukasey and the
ABA Task Force agree: an enemy combatant has a right to a lawyer. 50 At its
"Midyear Meeting" in February 2003, the ABA, the largest bar association in the
United States and the defacto ethical voice of the bar,5 overwhelmingly opposed
42 Preliminary Report, ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants (Aug. 8,
2002) at 5 [hereinafter Task Force Report]. The report was not the work of civil libertarians.
The Task Force was chaired by a former assistant United States attorney and included a
retired brigadier general who spent twenty-six years as an Army Judge Advocate, as well as
the current president of the National Institute of Military Justice. Moreover, judges and big-
business attorneys dominate the ABA itself.
41 Id. at 23.
44 Id.
45 id.
46 Id. at 18.
" Moussaoui is the only person charged in this country with a role in the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, and the government is seeking the death penalty. See Tom Jackman,
Moussaoui Asks to Call Three More al Qaeda Witnesses, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2003, at
A18.
48 On January 30,2003, Richard Reid, the British drifter and Muslim fundamentalist who
attempted to detonate bombs in his shoes during a transatlantic flight, was imprisoned for life
as the first admitted member of al Qaeda sentenced in the United States since the terrorist
attacks on September 11,2001. Pamela Ferdinand, Would-Be Shoe Bomber Gets Life Term,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at Al.
49 So, for that matter, does an Australian detainee at the Guantanamo Bay Prison whao
was given a lawyer. See John Mintz, Guantanamo Bay Detainee is First to Be Given a
Lawyer, WASH. POST., Dec. 4,2003, at A8. But see Susan Schmidt, Qatari Man Designated
An Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at Al. Foreign national Ali S. Marri,
described by federal prosecutors as an al Qaeda "sleeper operative," was designated as an
enemy combatant but was not given a lawyer.
50 See Task Force Report, supra note 42; Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
5' See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 688-91 (1989).
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the Bush administration's anti-terrorism measure that bars United States citizens
jailed as enemy combatants from consulting with defense lawyers: the ABA's
policy-making body voted 368-76 to approve a proposal backing the right of United
States citizens held as enemy combatants to have access to lawyers and judicial
review of their status.52 It also urged Congress to establish clear standards and
procedures for the designation of enemy combatants and their treatment.53
Judge Mukasey and the ABA agree that the Sixth Amendment does not apply
before the initiation of criminal proceedings, but they also agree that the Sixth
Amendment can still enlighten other considerations.' The Sixth Amendment
establishes the bare minimum that defendants must receive, and even the Supreme
Court has recognized a Sixth Amendment right against custodial interrogation
without access to counsel.55 The Sixth Amendment is the starting point of the ethics
analysis, not the end of it.5" It would be wise to interpret the anti-contact rule in an
expansive, rather than a restrictive, manner.
M. RULE 4.2 SHOULD APPLY TO PREINDICTMENT, CUSTODIAL, OVERT
INTERVIEWS
The rule of professional conduct that governs contact by a lawyer with a person
represented by counsel is set forth in Model Rule 4.2," and the reasoning behind
Model Rule 4.2 should guide the treatment of American enemy combatants.
The following discussion assumes that the American enemy combatant is
represented by counsel (though given the current state of affairs, this is no small
assumption). George Harris, one of "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh's
principal defense attorneys, stated that he and attorney James Brosnahan were
involved from December 1, 2001, but that "[fjor 55 days Lindh was essentially held
incommunicado.""8  Padilla's attorney, Donna R. Newman, was appointed to
52 ABA Supports Access to Counsel for Alleged Enemy Combatants, ABA NEWS
RELEASE, at http://www.abanet.orgmedia/feb03/021103.htn-l (Feb. 11, 2003).
" See Gina Holland, ABA Demands Rights for Enemy Combatants, AP WIRES, Feb. 10,
2003.
See Task Force Report, supra note 42; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600, 603.
5 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,491 (1964).
56 It is interesting to note that a similar right to counsel, deriving from the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, arises during custodial
interrogation, regardless of the existence of adversarial proceedings. See U.S. CONST. amend.
V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (holding that police must terminate
interrogation of an accused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel).
" See MODEL RuLE 4.2, supra note 24.
58 John Andrews, John Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years, World Socialist Web Site,
at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/oct2002/lind-o07.shtnil (Oct. 7, 2002) (reporting the
interview with Harris); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986) (holding
that the failure of police to inform defendant of his attorney's efforts (the attorney was
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represent him on May 15, 2002,-9 but after he was designated an enemy combatant
on June 9, she was unable to meet with him despite Judge Mukasey's December
order that Padilla be permitted to consult with her.6" The government asked the
court to reconsider and, in an opinion issued on March 11, 2003, Judge Mukasey
reaffirmed Padilla's right to access to counsel.6 The government appealed, and a
three-member appeals court panel of the Second Circuit heard arguments on
November 17, 2003.62 It has been more than 18 months since Padilla has been
allowed to meet with his attorney.63 Hamdi has fared no better. On June 11, 2002,
the district court appointed Federal Public Defender Frank Dunham as his counsel.6
Judge Doumar twice ordered the Justice Department to let Hamdi meet with
Dunham, only to have that order stayed both times by the appeals court.65
Model Rule 4.2 expressly provides for ex parte (without the consent of the
represented person's lawyer) communications that are "authorized by law. 66 The
majority of circuit courts have held that preindictment, noncustodial, undercover
contacts with represented persons during criminal investigations do not violate the
anti-contact rule.67
retained by defendant's sister without his knowledge) to reach him, did not deprive defendant
of his fight to counsel or vitiate waiver of his Miranda rights, but stating that "the 'deliberate
or reckless' withholding of information is objectionable as a matter of ethics.") (emphasis
added).
9 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
I ld. at 572 ("Newman has averred that she was told she would not be permitted to visit
Padilla at the South Carolina facility, or to speak with him; she was told she could write to
Padilla, but that he might not receive the correspondence.").
6 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Judge Says
Padilla May See Lawyers, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A8.
62 Michelle Garcia, Appeals Court Weighs Case of Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST, Nov.
18, 2003, at A3.
63 id.
4 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,460 (4th Cir. 2003).
65 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2002). As this Article
was about to go to press, the Bush Administration reversed its policy, saying that Hamdi
would be allowed access to a lawyer. However, the government emphasized that the decision
should not be treated as precedent. The change in policy came on the eve of a government
filing due at the Supreme Court on December 3. 2003, before the Court reviewed Hamdi's
detention. See Jerry Markon & Dan Eggen, U.S. Allows Lawyer for Citizen Held as 'Enemy
Combatant', WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al.
66 See MODEL RuLE 4.2, supra note 24.
67 See United States v. Baiter, 91 F.3d 427,435-36 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1011 (1996); United States v. Johnson, 68 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731,739-40 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 852 (1983).
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But in the case of the United States citizens detained as enemy combatants, the
contacts with them involve preindictment, custodial, overt contacts with represented
persons for "intelligence gathering" and possible criminal prosecution at a later
date. As a matter of ethics, these contacts are not "authorized by law" within the
meaning of Model Rule 4.2.68 Congress' September 2001 joint resolution
authorizing the use of military force,69 the Patriot Act,70 the United Nations Security
Council's resolution recognizing our country's right to self-defense, 71 and NATO's
Article V of the Washington Treaty construing "an ... attack against one" as "an
attack against... all,",72 do not address the detention of United States citizens as
enemy combatants.
Moreover, the Administration has not sought a legislative structure setting forth
the grounds for detention, the maximum periods of detention, forms of
administrative or judicial review, or any of the other conditions that would help
legalize the process.73 On February 7, 2003, a preliminary draft of a bill titled the
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,74 which would be a potential
successor to the Patriot Act, was leaked to the Center for Public Integrity and posted
on the Internet. However, the draft bill, popularly referred to as the Patriot Act II,
does not answer these questions.75
61 MODEL RuLE 4.2, supra note 24.
69 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The
preamble to the resolution states that the acts of September 11, 2001 were attacks against the
United States that "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise
its rights to self-defense." Id.
71 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
71 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
72 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,246.
71 See Editorial, Detaining Americans, WASH. POST, June 11,2002, at A24 (asserting that
Congress' role is to help find a thoughtful balance between security interests and individual
rights). See generally Philip Heymann, The Power to Imprison, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002,
at B7 (stating that the President's claim to power for detaining citizens as combatants is not
bolstered by congressional support).
7 Patriot Act II, supra note 8.
s Charles Lane, U.S. May Seek Wider Anti-Terror Powers, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2003,
at Al, A13. As of at least January 2003, the Department of Justice has been drafting new
anti-terrorism legislation. The draft legislation grants sweeping powers to the government,
eliminating or weakening many of the checks and balances that remained on government
surveillance, wiretapping, detention and criminal prosecution even after passage of the
Patriot Act. See id. On September 10, 2003, President Bush officially announced and
endorsed, in the form of a three-point plan, the so-called "Patriot Act II." See Eric Lichtblau,
Bush Seeks to Expand Access to Private Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at
http://www.nytimes.con/2003/09/14/national/14PATR.html.
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Instead, the draft bill expands the Bush Administration's "enemy combatant"
definition to all American citizens who "may" have violated any provision of
Section 802 of the first Patriot Act.7 6 In an execution of legislative gymnastics of
Olympic proportions, Section 501 of the draft bill, deceptively titled "Expatriation
of Terrorists, 17 strips even native-born Americans of all the rights of United States
citizenship if they provide support to a "terrorist organization,"" allowing them to
be imprisoned indefinitely in their own country as undocumented aliens. This
presumptive denationalization of American citizens who support the activities of
any organization that the executive branch deems "terrorist" is a throwback to the
McCarthy Era79 and is contrary to citizenship as a "constitutional birthright."80
If anything, denying American enemy combatants access to counsel is contrary
to existing law.81 The Hamdi case did not specifically reach the issue. The Padilla
case is the only decisional authority directly on point, and it grants access to
counsel, at a minimum, for the purpose of presenting facts to the court in connection
with a habeas corpus petition. 2
Moreover, the U.S. Code, in a broad and categorical provision that repealed the
Emergency Detention Act,8 3 provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
76 Patriot Act, supra note 70, at § 802. Section 802 contains the new definition of
domestic terrorism, which includes activities that "involve acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State," when they appear
to be intended to coerce civilians or government policy or conduct. Id.
" Patriot Act II, supra note 8, at § 501.
78 id.
" See generally CoLE &DEMPSEY, supra note 3 (comparing the terrorist threat response
to the anti-communist response in the 1950s).
80 See Afroyimv. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). The Supreme Court's current jurisprudence
gives Americans vigorous protections against involuntary loss of citizenship. The current rule
- that citizenship can only be relinquished voluntarily - was established in this landmark
case. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment established "a citizenship
which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once acquired, this Fourteenth
Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal
Government, the States, or any other governmental unit." Id. at 262.
81 See generally Task Force Report, supra note 42 (discussing the history of the treatment
of enemy combatants through precedent and statutes).
82 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
83 Emergency Detention Act of 1950, tit. 2, §§ 100-16, 64 Stat. 1019 (1950) (repealed
1971).
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otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 4
The Supreme Court read this provision expansively to apply to any and all United
States citizens detained by the government under any circumstances.85
Finally, a variety of other recognized international agreements condemn
denying access to counsel.86 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
everyone "has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law."87 The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment, a General Assembly Resolution, requires that "[a]
detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel. He shall
be informed of his right by the competent authority promptly after arrest and shall
be provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it."88  The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prescribes certain standards and procedures
that should be followed in all courts and tribunals.
8 9
There is an avalanche of authority that the government is not authorized by law
to communicate with represented American enemy combatants.9" If prosecuted,
Padilla and Hamdi will have the benefit of the constitutional protections afforded
all defendants in American criminal prosecutions - such as the right to counsel,
the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to a jury trial. But the due
process protections normally found in the criminal justice system are the minimum.
It stands to reason, therefore, that there should be just as much, if not more,
8 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2002). See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479-80 n.3 (1981)
(finding that "the plain language of § 400 1(a) proscrib[es] detention of any kind by the
United States, absent a congressional grant of authority to detain"). But see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress' joint resolution
authorizing the use of military force provided congressional authorization for Hamdi's
detention); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 598 (holding that the Act applies and its terms have
been complied with by Congress' joint resolution).
85 Howe, 452 U.S. at 479 n.3 (emphasis added).
86 Article 5 of what is sometimes referred to as the Third Geneva Convention is not
directly relevant to the treatment of United States citizens who are detained in this country.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 5-6
U.S.T. 3316, 3322-3324, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468 (holding that
the language in the Geneva Convention is not self-executing and does not create private
rights of action in the domestic courts of the signatory countries); cf Padilla, 233 F. Supp.
2d at 590,592-93 (stating inter alia that the Geneva Convention applies whether or not a war
has been declared).
87 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d sess., pt. 1,
at 73, art. 8 (1948).
8 G.A. Res. 173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 297, 299 (1988) (Principle
17(1)). Most of the thirty-nine principles listed in this document have been violated.
89 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, arts. 14-15,
999 U.N.T.S. 172, 176-77.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
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protection for enemy combatants. As the Padilla court noted, "this is not the usual
case."
91
American enemy combatants are more vulnerable than the average criminal
defendant because they are detained in solitary confinement indefinitely,
incommunicado, and without charges; they can be interrogated more aggressively;
and they are clearly among the most despised people in this country. 92 Moreover,
the "level of personal involvement by a Cabinet-level officer in the matter... is...
unprecedented... . [W]hen viewed in comparison to past cases, the circumstances
present here seem at least 'very special."' 93 The Padilla court noted that "it would
be a mistake to create the impression that there is a lush and vibrant jurisprudence
governing these matters. There isn't."94 Even as the Supreme Court placed limits
on the government's authority to detain immigrants awaiting deportation, in an eerie
foreshadowing of the September 11 th attacks, the Court was careful to point out that
the case before it did not involve "terrorism or other special circumstances where
special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention."95 If the intent
of Model Rule 4.2 is to be honored, enemy combatants must be allowed counsel, for
it is "[difficult to] think of a more definite description of the type of situation where
it would be a good thing to have a lawyer."96
In its seminal opinion on Model Rule 4.2, the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility noted that because "prosecutors have substantial control
over the timing of an indictment, limiting the Rule to post-indictment
communications could allow the government to 'manipulate grandjury proceedings
9' Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (discussing court's jurisdiction).
92 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Only by
zealously guarding the rights of the most humble, the most unorthodox and the most despised
among us can freedom flourish and endure in our land."); see also Cole, supra note 10, at
959 ("In the end, the true test ofjustice in a democratic society is not how it treats those with
a political voice, but how it treats those who have no voice in the democratic process.").
9" Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 581-82 (discussing the court's jurisdiction).
94 Id. at 607.
" Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
96 Talk of the Nation: Enemy Combatants (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 11, 2003) (quoting
A.P. Carleton Jr., President of the ABA); see also Anthony Lewis, The Silencing of Gideon's
Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003 (Magazine), at 50, 77:
[Enemy combatants] are not in precisely Gideon's position. They are not being
prosecuted; they are being held indefinitely, without charges, in solitary
confinement. They are not looking for counsel; they both already have lawyers,
highly competent ones appointed by federal judges. But they are not allowed to
talk to them. Those differences from Gideon's situation seem to make their need
to consult the lawyers they have, if anything, more compelling.
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to avoid its encumbrances. "'97 The same argument can be made with respect to the
government having absolute control over the timing of a "law enforcement"
proceeding as opposed to the seemingly more innocuous and less adversarial
"intelligence gathering" process.9s Limiting the Model Rule to civil and criminal
proceedings could allow the government (the military and the prosecutors) to
manipulate the timing and characterization of "intelligence gathering" to avoid the
dictates of the Model Rule.99 In the Lindh case, the government utterly blurred the
two.
1 00
As reflected in the public record, before the Lindh interrogation, the
Department of Justice's internal ethics unit advised, "[W]e don't think you can have
the FBI agent question [him]. It would be a pre-indictment, custodial overt
interview, which is not authorized by law." '' When the FBI interviewed Lindh
despite this recommendation, the ethics unit then advised that "Lindh's confession
might 'have to be sealed' and 'only used for national security purposes,' not in a
criminal case against him,"1°2 which is exactly how the government tried to use it.
The government has contended that appointment of counsel for enemy
combatants in the absence of charges would interfere with intelligence gathering by
establishing an adversarial relationship with the captor from the outset.0 3 But using
information from intelligence gathering for criminal prosecution subverts the rule.
The purpose of the rule is to protect from government overreaching.
" ABA Formal Op., supra note 40, at 31 (citing United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834,
839 (1988)).
98 Cf Michael Powell, No Choice but Guilty, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A1O
(explaining how the "enemy combatant" label is being used to coerce the criminal process).
9 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing "detention
rather than the initiation of criminal charges"); Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (discussing
the government's assertion that Padilla might communicate intelligence via his counsel if
allowed to confer with them).
100 See Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50; see also
Andrew Cohen, Feds Counterattack in Lindh Case, COURT WATCH, July 1, 2002, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/0 l/newslopinion/courtwatch/main513967.shtml
(three different interrogation periods were at issue: 1) the initial period when Lindh talked
to U.S. Special Forces troops, 2) a subsequent five-day period when Lindh was being
interrogated by other military officials, and 3) a two-day period, from December 9-10, when
Lindh was questioned by the FBI. "The government's case essentially stands or falls on
Lindh's statements to his captors and then to FBI agents who questioned him.").
'0' Mayer, supra note 100, at 58; see also Michael Isikoff, The Lindh Case E-Mails,
NEWSWEEK, June 24, 2002, at 8.
102 Mayer, supra note 100, at 58 (quoting Isikoff, supra note 101).
103 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002) (expressing concern that the
June 11 order of the district court "does not consider what effect petitioner's unmonitored
access to counsel might have upon the government's ongoing gathering of intelligence").
That issue, however, was not presented in the appeal that led to the Fourth Circuit's most
recent decision. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 466 n.4 (4th Cir. 2003).
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IV. PROPOSAL
This Article proposes amending the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 to add the
following language:
This Rule applies to communications with a United States citizen
detained as an illegal or unlawful "enemy combatant," prior to the
initiation of law enforcement proceedings, who is represented by counsel
concerning the matter to which the communication relates. If the
communication relates only to intelligence gathering, then this Rule
would not be triggered.
Such a change would be ethically sound and consonant with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, while at the same time showing proper deference to the
government's legitimate security and intelligence interests.
After all, in the Padilla case, "[t]he government has argued that affording
access to counsel would 'jeopardize the two core purposes of detaining enemy
combatants - gathering intelligence about the enemy, and preventing the detainee
from aiding in any further attacks against America."" 4 The Hamdi decision
similarly outlines three vital military "detention interests," directly derived from the
war powers of Articles I and II of the Constitution,"0 5 for holding enemy
combatants: incapacitation, relieving the burden on military commanders of
conforming their conduct with the encumbrances of civilian litigation, and
intelligence gathering.10 6
In point of fact, the Hamdi decision reiterates that these interests are
accomplished through "detention rather than the initiation of criminal charges"'0 7
and "detention in lieu of prosecution." ' 8 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
articulated the same objective with respect to the Padilla case:
Here is an individual who has intelligence information... [Olur interest
really in his case is not law enforcement, it is not punishment because he
104 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (quoting the government's response to the court's
October 21, 2002 order).
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
106 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465-66. The third detention interest, that of intelligence
gathering, was not an issue on appeal. Id. at 466 n.4; see also Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600
("Padilla's detention 'does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal
punishment: retribution or deterrence."') (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
361-62 (1997)).
'o' Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465.
10 Id.
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was a terrorist or working with the terrorists .... [W]e are not interested
in trying him at the moment; we are not interested in punishing him at
the moment. We are interested in finding out what he knows."°9
Accordingly, if the detention interest is strictly developing needed intelligence,
and not eventual criminal prosecution, the anti-contact rule should pose no
impediment. As the Hamdi court emphasized: "We are not here dealing with a
defendant who has been indicted on criminal charges in the exercise of the
executive's law enforcement powers."' 10
Part of the problem facing enemy combatants emerges from a solution to a
different and laudable goal: increasing coordination between law enforcement
agencies (such as the FBI) and intelligence agencies (such as the CIA) in terrorism
investigations. The attacks of September 1 th highlighted a breakdown in the
collection and sharing of information by the two communities.' 1' While this
criticism is valid, the solutions go beyond dismantling institutional barriers, and end
up short-circuiting procedures designed to protect the innocent. Ethics concerns
develop when criminal prosecutions are bootstrapped onto military investigations. "2
By way of analogy, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that lesser standards relating to search and seizure might be
appropriate for cases relating to national security." 3 But it also made clear that
lower standards are permissible only with respect to the "collecting and maintaining
of intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt to gather
evidence for specific criminal prosecutions.""' 4
The Supreme Court did not suggest that the foreign intelligence gathering rules
could be employed if the primary purpose was to prosecute criminal conduct; in
109 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74 (quoting News Briefing at the Department of
Defense (June 12, 2002), available at 2002 WL 22026773).
"(o Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473; cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (resolving a motion to suppress electronic surveillance and noting that the
most significant question was whether the searches in question were conducted for "foreign
intelligence purposes or law enforcement purposes").
"' See generally Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Unclear Danger: Inside the
Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2003, at Al (explaining how an arsenal of
new antiterrorism tools was applied to the case, including a free flow of information between
criminal investigators and intelligence officers, after September 1 th).
12 There is just as much of an ethics problem when military investigations - threatening
to designate defendants as "enemy combatants" - are used to coerce the criminal process.
However, that is beyond the scope of this Article.
"' See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court of Review recently issued an opinion - the first
in its history - that relied, in part, on this case. See In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002,
310 F.3d 717, 737-38 (Foreign Int.Surv.Ct.Rev. 2002).
114 United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318-19.
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fact, it suggested quite the opposite. Ironically, the Fourth Circuit similarly held
that national security and criminal prosecution are very different things. "5 National
security concerns recede, and individual privacy interests come to the fore, when
"the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal
prosecution,"" 6 not to gather intelligence.
It is sometimes difficult to draw the line where intelligence gathering ends and
criminal prosecution begins, but when in doubt, the government should err in favor
of protecting individual rights. Otherwise, under the guise of intelligence gathering
and national security, prosecutors can circumvent otherwise applicable legal and
ethical requirements.
How can the legitimacy of the criminal justice system be safeguarded if the
government decides that it wants to prosecute after gathering intelligence? This can
be accomplished by sealing off contacts made for national security and intelligence-
gathering purposes (interrogations, interviews, statements, etc.) from those used for
criminal prosecution, and not using the former for the latter. Although the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct do not recognize, formally, the use of screening
procedures, screening has nonetheless been accepted in many jurisdictions as an
effective strategy."7
An effective screen would include the following factors: (1) the disqualified
military and/or civilian agents, officers and lawyers do not participate in the
criminal prosecution, (2) the disqualified military and/or civilian agents, officers
and lawyers do not discuss the matter with the prosecution team, (3) the disqualified
military and/or civilian agents, officers and lawyers represent through sworn
testimony that they have not imparted any tainted information to the prosecution
team, and (4) the disqualified military and/or civilian agents, officers and lawyers
do not have access to any files or documents relating to the prosecution and vice-
versa.
For example, the Padilla court suggested "there is no reason that military
personnel cannot monitor Padilla's contacts with counsel, so long as those who
participate in the monitoring are insulated from any activity in connection with...
a future criminal prosecution of Padilla.""' Such screening measures were not
s See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
116 Id. at 915.
117 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the
government promise to create a "Chinese Wall" so as not to use the testimony of the witness-
spouse against the non-witness spouse was sufficient to meet the claim of privilege by the
testifying spouse); United States v. Seregos, 655 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that
when the prosecutor and agent insulated themselves from the proceedings in which
immunized testimony was given, the evidence against the defendant was not tainted by such
testimony).
"' Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564,604 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis
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taken in the case of John Walker Lindh and "[ilt is no coincidence that the Lindh
[surprise plea bargain] deal came about on the eve of a scheduled week-long
[suppression] hearing that was going to bring into the open the specifics of how
Lindh was treated and by whom."'"
19
The Padilla court, upon reconsideration at the government's behest of the
access to counsel issue, amplified and elaborated its suggestion regarding screening:
The government does not explain the need for that separation [between
military interrogation and criminal law enforcement], and so I am left to
guess what it might be. One possible explanation might be a desire to
avoid polluting any future prosecution of Padilla with information
obtained as the result of his interrogation without counsel, although there
are ways to do that without separating the interrogation entirely from
this litigation. In fact, it is not unheard of for information that might
potentially invalidate a prosecution to be walled off within a single
prosecutor's office, and for the prosecution to proceed without
incident. 20
Future prosecutions of American enemy combatants would be well-advised to
follow this guidance.
V. CONCLUSION
Indefinite detention, detention without charge, secret deportation proceedings,
ethnic profiling, surreptitious searches and wiretaps, military tribunals,"2' and
citizens denied counsel and judicial review - these things sound a lot like the
hallmarks of the rogue nations and repressive regimes we are trying to defeat.
Whether the architect of such policies is Attorney General John Ashcroft or White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, many of these counterterrorism measures are -
if not unconstitutional - unnecessary, unwise and unethical.
Ethics rules "seek to regulate the conduct of lawyers according to the standards
of the profession quite apart from other laws or rules that may also govern a
added).
119 Andrew Cohen, Lindh Layers Are Peeling Away, COURT WATCH, Mar. 11, 2003 at
http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2003/03/1 l/news/opinion/courtwatch/main543497.shtml;
see also Larry Margasak, Lindh Pleads Guilty in Surprise Deal, AP WIREs, July 15, 2002.
120 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
121 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001). In such tribunals, the military would be
the prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner, the trials could be held in secret, classified
evidence could be used against the defendant without affording him an opportunity to
confront it, and there would be no judicial review. See id.
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lawyer's actions."' 2 2 Accordingly, by defining a lawyer's duties to maintain
standards of ethical conduct, ethics rules like Model Rule 4.2 may offer protections
beyond those provided by the Constitution, statute or case law. It defies logic to
think that attorneys on the side of law enforcement are not intimately involved in
the treatment of American enemy combatants.
The debate is framed repeatedly as one of civil liberties versus national security,
when in fact, the two concepts should not be seen in opposition. Without
preserving civil liberties, we will never have real security. Our greatest protection
from terrorism is preserving the constitutional freedoms that differentiate us from
the terrorists. If American citizens can be locked away without any sort of counsel
or meaningful review for as long as the United States remains at war with al Qaeda,
the liberty of all Americans effectively becomes the hostage of presidential whim.
An unbridled power of military detention will not forever be deployed only against
would-be terrorists.
'22 ABA Formal Op., supra note 40, at 31.
